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Abstract
The essays that follow analyze recent developments in government spending and
labor markets. In Chapter 1, I examine the “twin deficits” hypothesis in a new
light by pooling data from highly developed open economies to create a represen-
tative global economy. Previous work on twin deficits has yielded mixed evidence
supporting and refuting this theoretical explanation for the comovement of gov-
ernment budget and current account deficits. I estimate a vector autoregression
(VAR) model with panel data using Bayesian methods to determine the effects
of shocks to government spending on current account balances and real interest
rates using various groups of nations and time periods. The results indicate that
increases in government spending do not lead to increases in the current account
deficit. My findings do not support the predictions of the twin deficits hypothesis.
Motivated by the results in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 investigates the effects of
government spending shocks on output, consumption, employment, and interest
rates. To address empirical challenges related to fiscal policy lags, data availabil-
ity, and simultaneity, Chapter 2 uses the narrative approach to record announce-
ments of changes in military, national security, and counterterrorism spending
in the form of a defense and civil defense news variable called defnews. This
variable captures variation in defense and civil defense spending since September
11, 2001, a period that provides a natural experiment setting in which frequent
and meaningful changes in defense and civil defense spending occurred indepen-
dently of global and national business cycles. I implement a unique and extensive
data gathering process to combine data from six nations and use a panel VAR
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model with Bayesian estimation methods to show that defnews correctly iden-
tifies changes in total government expenditures. The paper proposes a new set
of stylized facts describing the effects of changes in government purchases that
support the predictions of the neoclassical model and describe a value of the fiscal
multiplier that is non-positive and close to zero.
Chapter 3 investigates changes in the relationship between unemployment du-
ration and unemployment rates in the United States. Although unemployment
rates have trended downward in the United States since the 1970s, mean un-
employment duration has risen. Over this same period, the dynamics of female
labor supply have changed dramatically: large numbers of women have entered
the labor force, women’s wages have risen, and wage elasticities have fallen. I use
Current Population Survey data to match individuals to their spouses and look
at how family labor supply (specifically, spouse wages and spousal employment)
has affected unemployment duration. This paper is coauthored with Professor
Donna Ginther from the University of Kansas and Melinda Pitts from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
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Chapter 1
Examining the Twin Deficits Hypothesis
in a Macroeconomic Panel
1.1 Introduction and Relevance of the Twin Deficits Hy-
pothesis
The twin deficits hypothesis has been the subject of persistent macroeconomic inquiry and
debate over the last thirty years. Basic economic theory tells us that increases in government
spending and inelastic demand for government bonds cause bond prices to fall when supply
rises to finance fiscal expansion. According to Mundell (1963), if capital is perfectly mobile
and capital flows are unrestricted, rising interest rates generate capital inflows that lead to
domestic currency appreciation and deterioration of the trade balance. This is the traditional
“twin deficits” story that is taught in introductory economics classes.
Between 1980 and 1986, as the U.S. federal budget deficit rose from $59 billion to $221
billion, the U.S. current account balance moved from a surplus of $2.3 billion to a deficit of
$147.2 billion. Between 2001 and 2004, the U.S. federal budget deficit rose from -$128 billion
to $413 billion while the U.S. current account deficit rose from $395 billion to $634 billion.
In Germany (between 2003 and 2007) and Japan (between 1996 and 2000), increases in
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government spending were matched by simultaneous increases in current account surpluses.
These data appear to be at odds with each other, and with basic economic theory.
In recent years the broader issue of government budget deficits drew international at-
tention due to large fiscal stimulus measures enacted following the financial crisis (e.g., the
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act and similar proposals across European Union
member states). In the U.S., fiscal stimulus packages totaled nearly six percent of 2008
nominal GDP. Among the G20 nations, total stimulus was over $2 trillion. This spending
generated widespread debate over acceptable levels of national debt (notably, Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2010 and Herndon et al., 2013). Austerity measures imposed in several European
nations led to criticism and protests from citizens facing economic hardship (IILS, 2011).
In mid-2006, the U.S. current account deficit was more than six percent of nominal GDP,
the highest in over forty years. A 2004 European Central Bank report labeled “Large and
growing U.S. current account deficits” as “...significant risk[s] for global financial stability”
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009). Large current account imbalances were not isolated to the
United States, however. Japan and Germany saw current account surpluses of almost five
and eight percent of GDP, respectively, with a current account deficit of over seven percent
of GDP in Australia.
Worldwide financial and capital flows are often asymmetric. While some of these imbal-
ances have diminished since the Great Recession, the U.S. continues to act as a safe haven for
financial inflows from around the world. Leading up to the financial crisis, concern over the
risks these imbalances posed to the global macroeconomy were well documented by leading
economists. Some suggested that a worldwide recession would be unavoidable should these
current account imbalances continue (Hausmann and Sturzenegger, 2005). Adding to this
issue’s complexity is the variety of policy actions and economic circumstances characterizing
these economies during this time period. The profile of the current account balance in the
U.S. has increased over the last forty years given a three-fold increase in real GDP over this
period plus the emergence of the dollar as the world’s leading international reserve currency.
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In response to the global imbalance dialogue and the search for macroeconomic cause and
effect that followed the recent global financial crisis, I investigate the twin deficits question
using a panel of eight countries. Data from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States are pooled to study the effects of general,
non-idiosyncratic shocks – much like those that were felt worldwide from 2007 to 2009 – on
government expenditures and the current account. This approach is unique among existing
empirical work on this topic. I estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) model using Bayesian
methods and an analytical prior to study these shocks in a representative advanced economy.
I divide these eight countries into subgroups to examine differences in deficit comovement and
shock responses over longer time periods. After controlling for unobserved country-specific
effects and the time periods spanning the global financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, we find that
increases in government spending do not lead to deterioration of the current account.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses aspects of the twin deficits hypothesis
studied by the existing literature. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 introduce the model and describe the
construction of the panel dataset. Section 1.5 addresses the Bayesian estimation method,
prior selection, and presents the results. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Is the current account a barometer of national economic health? In retrospect, the global
imbalances referenced above seem to have been clear warning signs for the financial crisis
that followed. At the time, however, some disagreed. Corden (2007) argues that current
account surpluses and deficits are simply the result of rational, country-specific spending
and saving decisions. Whether they refer to high saving rates in various Asian nations or
externally-financed consumption in the U.S. and the U.K., the resulting imbalances reflect
market equilibrium. Others have pointed to the fact that the magnitude of gross financial
flows between nations dwarf the reported net balances as reason to overlook the current
3
account as an important economic indicator. As Johnson (2009) details, netting inflows and
outflows against each other implicitly assumes that the risk characteristics of assets and
liabilities are similar, obscuring the fact that these assets and liabilities are not available to
cover one another in the event of liquidity shortage or financial instability.
As Obstfeld (2012) outlines, the uncertainty surrounding the significance of current ac-
count imbalances highlights the need to track and study their movement. Research from
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor (2011) and Schularick and Taylor (2012) has shown that sta-
tistically significant increases in domestic credit issuance foreshadow national and global
economic crises. They present empirical evidence suggesting current account deterioration
may precede economic slowdowns. Furthermore, current account balances help identify na-
tions that rely on financial inflows to finance spending in excess of domestic saving. These
countries may be at higher risk of economic disruption given changes in foreign investment
at the onset of global economic turmoil.
Previous empirical work on twin deficits consists primarily of time series data analyses
for individual nations. Effects of non-country specific shocks or interactions between nations
have not been considered. Bernheim (1988) uses OECD data from 1960 to 1984 to show that
trade deficits in the U.S., Canada, U.K., Mexico, and West Germany all increase in response
to rising government budget deficits. Kearney and Monadjemi (1990) use a VAR model with
quarterly data from the 1970s and 1980s to suggest that the twin deficits relationship breaks
down in the long run. Leachman and Francis (2002) show that relationships between the
budget balance and the trade balance in the U.S. may be time specific. Using data stretching
back to the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, the authors dismiss the twin deficits
hypothesis in the post-WWII period of 1948 to 1973, but find weak evidence of twin deficits
in the post-Bretton Woods period from 1974 to 1992. Mohammadi (2004) uses panel data
to examine the effects of increases in government spending financed via borrowing versus via
tax increases, finding evidence in favor of twin deficits.
To investigate this paradox, Kim and Roubini (2008) (hereafter K&R) use a VAR model
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to identify fiscal deficit shocks and their effects on real output, the current account, and
the real exchange rate in the United States. They argue that “twin divergence” is the more
accurate description of what has been seen in the United States since 1973. Except for
short periods in the 1980s and the early 2000s, the U.S. government budget deficit does
not move in tandem with the U.S. current account deficit. They find that shocks to the
primary government budget deficit lead to short-term improvement in the current account
and an increase in the real exchange rate (domestic currency depreciation). The latter result
also contradicts the twin deficits hypothesis since, in theory, domestic currency appreciation
should follow a rise in the primary government budget deficit. Numerous other studies,
including Ratha (2012), Makin and Narayan (2013), El-Baz (2014), and Baharumshah, Lau,
and Khalid (2004), also investigate twin deficits in individual countries. These studies find
mixed evidence for and against the twin deficits hypothesis.
1.3 Panel VAR Model
I use a vector autoregression (VAR) model (Sims, 1980) with quarterly data to estimate the
effects of government spending shocks on real output, the current account, the real interest
rate, and the real exchange rate. The definitions of these five variables are listed in Table
1.1.
The data are from the OECD Main Economic Indicators database and were obtained via
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). RGDP is constructed using seasonally adjusted
nominal GDP along with each nation’s GDP price deflator to obtain real GDP in year 2000
units of national currency. Logs are taken and the series is differenced to form growth rates.
GOV is calculated by dividing nominal government expenditures in each quarter by that
quarter’s nominal seasonally adjusted GDP figure.1 CUR is equal to the current account
balance divided by nominal GDP. The real interest rate RIR is calculated by taking each
1Nominal government expenditure data for Australia is not available. Instead, real government expendi-
ture data is adjusted to year 2000 Australian dollars.
5
country’s three-month interbank rate and subtracting the respective GDP price deflator
annual rate of change. Finally, the real exchange rate variable (RER) is constructed by
taking the log of the indexed OECD data series. I take the negative of this result to obtain
the traditional increase–depreciation and decrease–appreciation convention. Figures 1.1 and
1.2 show GOV and CUR from 1995 to 2012 for each nation in the panel. Figure 1.3 shows
similar data for a subset of four nations (Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) over a longer sample from 1982 to 2012. Summary statistics for the entire
dataset are shown in Table 1.2.
My panel dataset and the method in which it is constructed is unique. While many
applied microeconomics panels have large cross section and small time series dimensions,
mine is the opposite: the time series dimension is larger than the cross section. This is typical
of macroeconomic panels that involve multicountry analyses (for precedents, see Canova,
Ciccarelli, and Ortega (2012); Canova and Ciccarelli (2009); and Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and
Peydró (2013)). These differences are primarily related to data availability constraints, since
there are few nations for which quarterly data is available for all five variables I am using.
To avoid the pitfalls of applying asymptotic theory relying on on large N values to my
panel, I use Bayesian methods for estimation. The balanced panel consists of sixty-seven
(T = 67) quarterly observations for each country, with data beginning in the second quarter
of 1996 (2Q96) and ending in the fourth quarter of 2012 (4Q12). As referenced above, the
countries selected are those that make up the G7 plus Australia (N = 8). As in K&R, the
VAR contains four lags of each of the variables in Table 1.1. To capture the representative
effects of shocks to government spending, I pool the data into one group and stack the data
for individual nations to generate an overall sample of 536 observations. To account for
unobserved effects, dummy variables are included to capture idiosyncrasies pertaining to
individual nations and to the quarters spanning the global financial crisis. This structure is
formalized below.
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1.4 Constructing an International Panel
Before aggregating across countries and time periods, the model is given by (4.1) below.
Column vector yit contains current (period t) values of RGDP, GOV, CUR, RIR, and RER
for nation i. Column vector xit contains a constant term plus four quarters of lagged values
of each of these five variables in the same nation i. Additionally, dummy variables ci and vt
are included to capture unobserved effects specific to individual countries and the quarters
spanning the global financial crisis. Thus, for each nation i = 1, . . . , N , and for each time
period t = 1, . . . , T :
y′it = x
′
itβ + ci + vt + u
′
it. (1.1)
To pool these data into one large group, first I aggregate y′it, x′it, and u′it over t into yi,























When aggregating across countries, the dummy variable vt is configured into a T × 7
matrix vi that accounts for unobserved financial crisis effects in country i. Dummy variables







where I7 is the 7 × 7 square identity matrix and 050×7 and 010×7 are matrices of zeros.
Thus, (4.1) becomes
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yi = xiβ + viγ + ui. (1.2)
Finally, I construct a linear model that combines each individual country’s data into a
single sample. This procedure pools the data in the panel into one representative economy
and eliminates the need to estimate coefficients for each individual nation. Each country’s
yi, xi, and ui are stacked to form Y, X, and U that contain all current and lagged values























Matrices D and V contain the country and financial crisis dummy variables, respectively,
to be used as additional regressors. Since the model contains a constant, N − 1 country
dummy variables (one for each non-U.S. nation in the panel) are added. Furthermore, for










where D1 = IN−1 ⊗ ιT has dimension (N − 1)T × (N − 1), D2 is a matrix of zeros with







the global model can be expressed more compactly as
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Y = X̃B + U. (1.3)
With the panel consisting of N = 8 nations, the matrix B consists of five columns of
coefficients, one for each variable in Y. The rows of B contain coefficients for each of four
lags for each of the five variables, a constant term, the coefficients on the dummy variables
for the N − 1 nations, and the coefficients on the dummy variables for the quarters during
the financial crisis.
This dataset provides insight into the effects of government spending in an advanced open
economy. My analysis takes the point of view of a representative economy as opposed to
describing country-specific responses that have been the primary focus of previous empirical
research concerning twin deficits. This representative economy is formed by aggregating data
from eight nations as detailed above. I describe my results in the next section.
1.5 Estimation Procedure and Results
Out of consideration for the lack of clear consensus regarding the accuracy of the twin
deficits hypothesis, the model is estimated with a Normal-Wishart prior. The Normal-
Wishart prior is a conjugate prior for the multivariate normal distribution. This prior is
computationally simple and permits direct sampling without use of approximation techniques
like Gibbs sampling. The Normal-Wishart prior extends the Minnesota prior of Litterman
(1986) by drawing the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals from a
Wishart distribution rather than assuming it is fixed. To describe the Normal-Wishart
prior, I follow the notation used in Koop and Korobilis (2010).2 The Normal-Wishart prior
has the form
2Code adapted from http://personal.strath.ac.uk/gary.koop/bayes_matlab_code_by_koop_and_
korobilis.html is used to estimate the model.
9
α|Σ ∼ N (α,Σ⊗ V ) (1.4)
where
Σ−1 ∼ W (S−1, ν). (1.5)
where N and W denote the multivariate normal and Wishart distributions, respectively.
In (5.1), α = vec(B) from (4.3) above. The values of hyperparameters α, V , S, and ν are
chosen as follows. Litterman (1986) suggests setting prior coefficient means α based on the
unit of measurement of each variable. Variables measured in log-levels (i.e., GOV, CUR,
RIR, and RER) are assumed to follow a random walk pattern and have initial values of one
on the first own lag and zero elsewhere. For RGDP, measured as a growth rate, the prior
mean on all coefficients is zero. Also set to zero are the prior means of non-lagged variables
(the constant, plus the time and country dummies). Exogenous foreign demand for domestic
goods and services, a multitude of policy choices affecting fiscal spending and interest rates,
and a lack of empirically verified theories of exchange rate determination contribute to the
choices for these hyperparameters.
I construct the prior variance-covariance matrix V according to Karlsson (2013). Hyper-
parameters π = (π1, π3, π4) control overall prior tightness, the speed at which lagged values
shrink to zero, and the probability weight placed on deterministic variables (dummies and
constants), respectively.3 Benchmark parameter settings for π are (.2, 2, 100,000). These
values are derived from initial values suggested in Canova (2007). Additional hyperparam-
eter settings assigning various probability weight to prior and sample information are also
tested. I find that they have no material effects on the responses of the variables to shocks
to government spending.
S and ν define the distribution from which the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals,
Σ, is drawn. S is initially defined to be a diagonal matrix with entries from univariate
3In my implementation of the Normal-Wishart prior, the value π2 controls the relative tightness on own
lagged variables versus lags of other variables. It is normalized to one.
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autoregressive models for each independent variable. In these models, current period values
are regressed on four quarters of own lagged values and a constant. The estimates of the
error variance form the entries of S. ν controls the degrees of freedom of the prior. In this
model, ν = 7.
Values for the coefficients in (4.3) are drawn directly from the multivariate normal pos-
terior distribution given by
α|Σ ∼ N (ᾱ,Σ⊗ V̄ ) (1.6)
where
Σ−1|y ∼ W (S̄−1, ν̄). (1.7)
with V̄ , B̄, S̄, and ν̄ given by
V̄ = [V −1 + X̃′X̃]−1
B̄ = V̄ [V −1B + X̃′X̃B̂]
S̄ = S + S + B̂′X̃′X̃B̂ + B′V −1B− B̄′V −1 + (X̃′X̃)B̄
ν̄ = NT + ν.
(1.8)
In (5.3), ᾱ = vec(B̄). In (5.5), B is formed by transforming α from a vector back into a
matrix (i.e. back into the shape of B), and S = (Y − X̃B̂)′(Y − X̃B̂), where B̂ is the OLS
estimate of B.4
The structural shocks of the model are identified using a Choleski decomposition on Σ.
Impulse responses in Figures 1.4 and 1.5 display the median response from 10,000 poste-
rior draws. Also shown in these graphs are ninety percent confidence bands generated by
displaying the 5th and 95th percentiles of impulse responses from 10,000 draws. I focus on
several groups of countries: the complete panel with all G7 nations plus Australia; the com-
plete panel excluding the United States; the six North American and European nations of
4Koop and Korobilis (2010), Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997), and Karlsson (2013) provide complete math-
ematical derivations of the items in (4.5), (4.6), (4.7).
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Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and a smaller
panel including Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States for which
longer-term data is available. I am most interested in the responses of CUR and RER to
shocks to GOV, as these were the main predictions of the twin deficits hypothesis.
The impulse responses for the full panel of eight countries (row one of Figure 1.4) indicate
that the current account does not change significantly following a one percent increase in
government spending as a percentage of GDP. Real interest rates rise significantly before
retreating after approximately three quarters. The real exchange rate depreciates slightly,
which is consistent with the findings of K&R. Output decreases somewhat, but the majority
of the response of real GDP to shocks to GOV is not significant. In the non-U.S. panel (row
two of Figure 1.4), the responses of each variable are nearly identical to the full panel. For
the non-APAC panel (row three of Figure 1.4), the current account deteriorates slightly with
real interest rates rising significantly and no change in the exchange rate. In row four of
Figure 1.4, the responses of a subset of four nations – Canada, Germany, the U.K., and the
U.S. – differ from the larger panels in rows one through three. Output and real interest rates
decrease significantly, a slight improvement in the current account balance.
My results do not show the current account deteriorating significantly in response to
increases in government spending, which I use as a proxy for increases in the government
budget deficit.5 The slight depreciation in exchange rates seen in the full and non-U.S. panels
is small and lasts less than two quarters. In each panel, real GDP growth falls initially. This
may be the result of the government spending shock “crowding out” investment before interest
rates decline as the shock fades. The negative movement in output on shock impact may also
be the product of consumers reducing consumption and supplying more labor in response to
increases in government spending as predicted by the neoclassical model.
To check the sensitivity of the results to the time period we have selected, I extend the
5While is is not a perfect solution to the lack of quarterly government budget deficit data, it is reasonable
to assume that these countries would finance additional spending via borrowing given that each country,
with the slight exception of Germany, has consistently run annual budget deficits.
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analysis to include much of the 1980s. Figure 1.5 shows impulse responses from a four-country
panel (Canada, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S.) over various time periods covering the
early 1980s to 2012. These panels are constructed in the same manner described in Sections
1.3 and 1.4.
Row one of Figure 1.5 includes impulse responses generated from data spanning the
second quarter of 1982 to the second quarter of 2012. This longer sample shows a slight
decline in the current account following a shock to government spending. The real interest
rate decreases briefly after approximately four quarters. There is no immediate movement
in exchange rates, though some depreciation is seen after several years. In rows two and
three of Figures 1.5 I consider two mutually exclusive sub-periods of the longer period in
row one. In neither case do I find significant current account deterioration or exchange
rate appreciation following increases in government spending. In each of these three panels,
real output decreases significantly on shock impact. Overall, these responses do not provide
evidence confirming the twin deficits hypothesis. My results have shown this for a variety of
country groupings and time periods.
1.6 Conclusion
This work has shown how pooling data from multiple nations into a macroeconomic panel
provides empirical international evidence that the primary claim of the twin deficits hypoth-
esis – that increases in the government budget deficit lead to increases in the current account
deficit – is not supported by an analysis that uses panel data to create a representative ad-
vanced economy. In several cases, the first chapter of the twin deficits story is confirmed:
real interest rates rise significantly following positive shocks to government expenditures.
However, my results do not consistently show downward movement in the current account
or appreciation of real exchange rates.
The goal of this paper has been to improve knowledge of the relationship between gov-
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ernment spending and the current account balance. As alluded to in Section 1.2, the current
account plays an important role in portending future economic trouble. Forthcoming research
will focus on expanding these findings to generate new conclusions, focusing specifically on
the use of panel data to investigate the effects of government spending. Once these basic
macroeconomic connections are better understood, economists will be better equipped to
recognize looming economic problems. I expect that these questions will continue to be
leading objects of interest for policymakers in both the near term and the long term.
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Variable Description
RGDP Growth rate of real GDP; GDP measured in year 2000 local currency
GOV Government expenditures as a percentage of nominal GDP
CUR Current account as a percentage of nominal GDP
RIR 3-month interbank rates, adjusted for inflation
RER Log of real effective exchange rate based on manufacturing consumer price index
Table 1.1: Variable definitions
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
RGDP 536 0.19% 0.34% -1.83% 1.22%
GOV 536 18.93% 2.96% 12.01% 25.04%
CUR 536 -0.58% 3.23% -7.19% 7.77%
RIR 536 1.51% 2.59% -7.64% 15.36%
RIR 536 0.01 0.14 -0.28 0.42
Table 1.2: Summary statistics for full panel
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Figure 1.1: First half of plots of GOV and CUR, 1995 to 2012
GOV (solid line) and CUR (dashed line) are each measured as a percentage of nominal
GDP.

























































Figure 1.2: Second half of GOV and CUR, 1995 to 2012
GOV (solid line) and CUR (dashed line) are each measured as a percentage of nominal
GDP.

























































Figure 1.3: Plots of GOV and CUR, 1981 to 2012
GOV (solid line) and CUR (dashed line) are each measured as a percentage of nominal
GDP.


















































































Response of CUR, Shock to GOV (% of GDP)









Response of RIR, Shock to GOV (bps)
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Figure 1.4: Impulse responses of 1% shock to GOV for various panels, 2Q96 to 4Q12
First row includes data from all eight nations; second row, data from all non-U.S. nations;
third row, data from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, U.K., U.S.; fourth row, data from
Canada, Germany, U.K., U.S. Dashed lines indicate ninety percent confidence bands.
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Figure 1.5: Impulse responses of 1% shock to GOV for four-country panel, various periods
Four-country panels includes data from Canada, Germany, U.K., U.S. First row includes
data from the period 2Q82 to 4Q12; second row, 2Q82 to 1Q96, third row, 2Q96 to 4Q12.
Dashed lines indicate ninety percent confidence bands.
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Chapter 2
Identifying the Effects of Government
Spending Shocks in a Macroeconomic
Panel
2.1 A Challenging Macroeconomic Question
Confusion surrounding the specific effects of changes in government spending on consump-
tion, wages, output, and interest rates is costly for researchers and policymakers. As
economies move along the path of the business cycle, fiscal spending is a tool for central
banks and governments to smooth disturbances and sustain economic progress. But un-
certainty surrounding the correct scale and timing of proposed stimulus packages can limit
their welfare effects. Government stimulus packages enacted worldwide in response to the
global financial crisis of the late 2000s were designed to mitigate recessions and widespread
job losses that affected many countries. In the United States, the American Reinvestment
and Recovery Act (ARRA) earmarked $840 billion to be spent over a ten-year period low-
ering taxes, increasing unemployment benefits, and funding construction and infrastructure
projects (Congressional Budget Office, 2015). Australia, Canada, Italy, France, and the
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United Kingdom each used combinations of infrastructure spending, tax relief, and labor
market interventions to jump-start their economies during the post-crisis years (IILS, 2011).
With the multitude of policy actions taken during this period – from changes in interest
rates to troubled asset relief – it is very difficult to quantify the orthogonal effects of these
stimulus packages. Ideally, economic models studying the effects of fiscal spending should
isolate variation that is independent of business cycle dynamics. However, truly exogenous
changes in government spending are difficult to extract given the noisy nature of macroeco-
nomic data, the large potential for simultaneity, and the challenges in addressing lags and
timing issues associated with fiscal policy.
In the absence of controlled experiments, macroeconomists can use creative research de-
sign to reduce endogeneity in empirical analyses. One such method, the narrative approach,
is a non-statistical technique that identifies variation in time series data by reviewing the his-
torical record. By creating variables derived from media reports, policy records, and official
data sources describing changes outside the business cycle, economists can test how macroe-
conomic variables of interest respond in the months and quarters following shocks. This
procedure stands in contrast to the identification approaches of structural VAR models that
apply shocks to total government spending and find contrasting effects on consumption and
wages relative to studies identifying government spending shocks using military buildups.
This dichotomy has implications for governments and policymakers, and for economists
whose theoretical models are evaluated in comparison with economic data.
In the analysis that follows I utilize the narrative approach to develop a measure of gov-
ernment spending changes in a panel of mature, developed nations. From articles appearing
in national newspapers, I extract the dates, amounts, and spending horizons of changes in
military and civil defense expenditures related to military buildups, acts of terrorism at home
and abroad, and other geopolitical events over the period since the September 11 attacks
in the United States. I have identified this period as one in which frequent and meaningful
changes in defense and civil defense spending levels were motivated by factors independent
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of the global business cycle. This period provides a unique experimental setting where I
can more clearly assess causality between macroeconomic variables. I record these spending
amounts in the form of a defense and civil defense news variable, defnews, and show that
shocks to defnews correctly identify changes in total government spending. I use this vari-
able in a panel VAR model with output, interest rates, consumption, unemployment, and
wages in six advanced economies to develop a new set of stylized facts describing the effects
of changes in government spending that are disconnected from the business cycle.
By gathering data from multiple nations, I am able to increase the dimensions of my
dataset in spite of a sample period that is short relative to empirical studies reviewing several
decades of data. As discussed in Canova and Ciccarelli (2009, 2013), panel, or multicountry,
VARs combine time series data from a collection of nations, markets, or sectors. Panel
VARs have previously been used to examine business cycle dynamics in groups of nations
(e.g., Canova and Ciccarelli (2012)), to study the spillover effects of government spending
shocks across borders (Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011)), and to investigate the transmission
of financial shocks between countries in an optimum currency area (Ciccarelli, Maddaloni,
and Peydró (2013)). My multicountry VAR model provides estimates of the representative
effects of changes to government spending in an advanced economy. The model generates
these estimates while also accounting for factors specific to each country that could influence
these representative estimates.
The structure of the panel, which has a short cross section and a moderate time series
length, precludes me from using certain classical methods that rely on larger dimensions to
sustain the asymptotics required for efficient and unbiased inference. For this reason, and
because of the benefits provided by shrinkage in a model with over 200 unknown parameters, I
estimate my model using Bayesian methods. The shrinkage provided by the prior distribution
enables me to more easily manage the large number of parameters in my model and reduce
much of the uncertainty in the responses of the dependent variables. In conjunction with
my uniquely constructed defnews variable, this approach sharpens the conclusions I make
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regarding the effects of changes in government spending.
Similar to Ramey (2011), my estimates of the effects of increases in government spending
on consumption, unemployment, and the real wage support the results of the neoclassical
model. The neoclassical model predicts that households reduce consumption and supply
more labor in response to increases in government expenditures financed by lump-sum taxes.
In the short term, this reduces the equilibrium real wage and increases the marginal product
of capital. Interest rates rise, fueling an increase in investment; capital accumulates and
the real wage returns to its steady state level. The results from my panel VAR model show
that consumption and unemployment each fall in response to an increase in government
spending. These results stand in contrast to New Keynesian models predicting increases in
consumption and the real wage following shocks to government purchases. I provide new
evidence explaining the macroeconomic responses in advanced economies to defense and civil
defense spending events that have become increasingly common over the last fifteen years.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant pieces of the existing
literature. Section 2.3 describes my Ramey (2011)-inspired instrument for defense spending
and the data collection process that generated it. Section 2.4 describes the rest of the data,
the model, and the estimation procedure. Section 2.5 presents the results and Section 2.6
provides concluding remarks.
2.2 Review of Precedent Literature
2.2.1 The Theoretical and Empirical Effects of Government Spend-
ing
According to neoclassical theory, an increase in government spending financed by lump sum
taxes triggers a negative wealth effect that lowers consumption and precipitates an increase
in agents’ labor supplied. This lowers the equilibrium real wage and increases the marginal
product of capital. The real interest rate rises, capital accumulates, and the marginal product
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of capital falls, with the real wage declining to its original level. Hall (1980), Barro (1981),
Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1992), and Baxter and King (1993) each examine the
effects of changes in government spending in a neoclassical framework. Hall (1980) and Barro
(1981) find that hours worked and output are expected to increase under either temporary
or permanent increases in government spending. Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum
(1992) and Baxter and King (1993) find that the response of output is greater when the
government spending increase is permanent. In contrast, Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
use a structural VAR model and U.S. data to show that increasing government spending
leads to increases in output and consumption. Perotti (2007) utilizes a structural VAR
approach with long-run annual data and finds evidence that the response of consumption
to government spending shocks can be positive. Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) use a
similar approach, concluding that consumption and the real wage increase following shocks
to government spending. They propose a New Keynesian model with sticky prices and
rule-of-thumb consumers to justify these results.
In these traditional VAR models (the aforementioned Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
Perotti (2007), and Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007)), assumptions made regarding
the ordering of variables – specifically, that government spending is exogenous to all other
variables in the system – is ubiquitous but unproven. If output determines taxes, and
subsequently the level of government expenditure, including consumption, taxes, and various
types of investment as additional variables in these VARs leads to questions about the validity
of the ordering.
Exploiting military buildups as sources of non-business cycle variation in government
spending is used throughout the literature to address the endogeneity concerns inherent
in traditional VAR analyses. This strategy relies on two key factors. First, changes in
military spending are unlikely to be correlated with the business cycle. As Hall (2009)
writes, “military spending does not respond to forces determining GDP or consumption...
but only to geopolitical events.” He also asserts: “the most direct way to measure the
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government purchases multiplier is to exploit large and arguably exogenous fluctuations in
military spending.” Using military spending as the lens through which to view shocks to
government spending reduces researchers’ exposure to endogeneity criticisms.
Second, the types of consumption undertaken by governments for defense purposes is
likely to be distinct from the types of consumption undertaken by households. It is reason-
able to expect that the goods purchased with defense and civil defense funds are unlikely to
affect contemporaneous labor-leisure tradeoffs of households. As Ramey (2011) notes, ag-
gregate government spending includes expenditures related to welfare programs, education,
and institutions. Spending on these items may influence households’ choices and muddle es-
timates drawn from models using total government expenditures as the source of variation.
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) construct a series that uses dummy variables to identify large
military buildups in the U.S. at three key dates: the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Estimates from an autoregressive model indicate increases
in output and declines in consumption and real wages consistent with a neoclassical model.
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) present an extension of Ramey and Shapiro in
which shocks to government spending elicit increases in output and employment but decreases
in consumption and the real wage. Ramey (2011) shows that shocks to government spending
in traditional VAR models can be predicted by the “war dates” shocks of Ramey and Shapiro,
and that differences in the responses of consumption and the real wage between the two
approaches are consequences of timing. Due to lengthy processes related to procurement
and awarding of contracts, delays between the dates of defense spending announcements and
the actual increases in government spending they generate lead traditional VAR models to
overlook initial declines in consumption and wages following shocks to government spending.
Ramey shows that shocks identified by the Ramey-Shapiro war dates approach Granger-cause
traditional VAR shocks, and that delaying the Ramey-Shapiro war dates by several periods
generates impulse responses matching those of the traditional VAR models. She enriches
the Ramey-Shapiro war dates by constructing a “defense news” variable that measures the
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present discounted value of defense spending as a percentage of lagged nominal GDP. Shocks
to this defense news variable produce declines in consumption and the real wage consistent
with Ramey and Shapiro (1998).
2.2.2 The Narrative Approach and Natural Experiments in Eco-
nomics
Both Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2011) use variables constructed from news-
paper and media reports of changes in military spending to construct new measures of
government spending. The procedure of extracting relevant information from the histori-
cal record, termed the narrative approach, first appeared in Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
and has been used more recently by Romer and Romer (1989) to identify monetary policy
shocks from meeting minutes and policy records of the Federal Reserve Board of Gover-
nors and the Federal Open Market Committee. Romer and Romer (2010) review economic
and Congressional reports to identify changes in tax legislation and the resulting effects
on output. Romer and Romer (2015) examine historical economic reports prepared by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to construct an index
of financial distress that measures the length and severity of financial crises. The variable
they construct captures changes in the cost of credit in crisis-stricken nations and allows
the authors to quantify the effects of financial crises – and their intensity – on GDP and
aggregate economic activity.
As I have described above, applying this technique to identification of government spend-
ing shocks is a creative way to tease out variation in macroeconomic time series data that
cannot easily be captured by statistical techniques. By focusing on civil defense spending in
addition to military buildups, I can study my research question in a natural experiment set-
ting that is generally elusive in social science research. As defined in Fuchs-Schuendeln and
Hassan (2015), natural experiments “provide observable, quasi-random variation in treat-
ment subject to a plausible identifying assumption.” This definition applies to the nature
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of changes in civil defense spending: they are highly likely to be the result of geopolitical
events (i.e., quasi-random) and uncorrelated with the optimizing decisions of households (a
plausible identifying assumption).
2.3 A Richer Measure of Changes in Government Spend-
ing
The objective of my unique and extensive data collection process is to find and record all
new announcements of changes to military and civil defense spending using the narrative
approach. These announcements are made, depending on the country and the legislative
process, by prime ministers, presidents, finance ministers, defense ministers, cabinet depart-
ments, and legislative bodies. These announcements capture both increases and decreases
in expenditures related to emergency situations, acts of terrorism at home and abroad, rein-
forcements to existing military or civil defense operations, new departments and initiatives,
and new capital projects for weapons, buildings, or aircraft. I search databases of media
sources, primarily newspapers, to gather data to construct a variable that is the foundation
of my analysis. I believe that this variable identifies quasi-exogenous changes to government
spending because it captures significant changes in government expenditures that are, for
the most part, a response to geopolitical events that occur independently of the business
cycle. This differentiates my analysis from the works described above that rely on models
identifying what is likely to be endogenous variation in government spending.
The variable I create, defnews, is similar to the defense news variable used in Ramey
(2011). The differences between what Ramey creates in her U.S.-only dataset and what I
construct for a panel of nations are twofold. First, the sample periods are different. My
sample period includes only the fifty-four quarters from the third quarter of 2001 to the
fourth quarter of 2014. I have identified this period as one in which homeland security
became a large priority for the nations in my panel. In response to the 9/11 attacks, French
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President Jacques Chirac remarked, “we must fight against terrorism by all means.” United
Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair said, “mass terrorism is the new evil in our world,”
and that “[this is a battle] between the free and democratic world and terrorism.” The 9/11
commission report released in 2004 by the U.S. government acknowledged that “countering
terrorism has become, beyond any doubt, the top national security priority for the United
States.” According to the Human Rights Watch, more than 140 countries, including all
six in the panel, passed counterterrorism laws since September 11, 2001. Focusing on the
variation in spending levels that took place during a period in which numerous resources
were mobilized to protect populations, military personnel, and national borders from the
burgeoning threat of terrorism provides a natural experiment setting in which government
spending levels changed independently of the state of the global economy.
Second, my defnews variable captures changes in civil defense spending in addition to
purely military and defense spending. These civil defense expenditures include airport se-
curity operations, intelligence services, bioterrorism prevention measures, police resources,
and other programs designed to protect borders and civilians. Although the amounts of
civil defense spending announcements are often lower than the military spending announce-
ments, their costs still range into the billions of units of national currency. I believe that they
complement the exclusively military data points and add a degree of depth to my defnews
variable above that of Ramey.
The panel consists of six countries: Australia, Canada, France, Italy, the United King-
dom, and the United States. I have chosen these nations because of their status as advanced
economies and global military powers. As determined by either development level (using
the Human Development Index) or purchasing power parity GDP per capita, each of these
countries is in the top thirty globally.1 These countries are attractive choices in which to
examine military, defense, and civil defense spending because of their ongoing commitments
to international security and stability. Among G7 nations, Italy, France, the United King-
1HDI data are from the 2014 Human Development Index Report from the United Nations Development
Program. PPP GDP data from World Bank, 2014.
29
dom and the United States are the top four nations as measured by the average of annual
defense spending as a percentage of overall government spending over the period from 2000
to 2014.2 Australia is included due to its participation in the Iraq War and, if it were in the
G7, the third-highest defense spending metric just described. Canada is included due to its
membership in the G7 and its participation, along with Australia, the U.K., and the U.S., in
the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. Together, the nations in the panel have a combined 240+
membership years on the United Nations Security Council and account for over $27 trillion
in 2014 purchasing power parity GDP.
A typical entry into the collection of defense and civil defense news events consists of a
description of the spending measure, the amount of spending, and the horizon of spending.
As in Ramey (2011), the value of defnews for a quarter is the sum of present discounted val-
ues of all announcements during that quarter taken as a percentage of the previous quarter’s
nominal GDP. Ten-year nominal government bond yields are used to discount the announce-
ment totals. As in Ramey (2011), announcements made during the last week of a quarter
are recorded in the next quarter to more accurately reflect the time period in which the
announcement affects the economy.
Many of the entries highlight changes scheduled to take place in the next or subsequent
fiscal years, though some – generally those related to emergencies or geopolitical events at
home or abroad – describe immediate increases or decreases in spending. In many cases,
newspapers contain multiple accounts of these spending announcements. Wherever possible,
I survey multiple reports for consistency and clarity of amounts and spending horizons. In
very few cases across the entire news series do I include a spending announcement that has
not been corroborated with more than one news report. I record only initial announcements
of new, previously undisclosed spending episodes. In the event that the details of a spending
plan are rumored or released prior to an official announcement, I record the earliest reliable
account of the spending package.
2International defense spending data from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2015,
http://milexdata.sipri.org.
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Additionally, it is often the case that previously announced spending initiatives undergo
revision, cancellation, upsizing, and downsizing due to a multitude of factors. In these cases,
I record the present discounted value of the revision – positive or negative – in the period
in which the revision was announced. As an example, in the second quarter of 2001, the
government of Australia announced a plan to spend A$47 billion on new capital equipment
projects for the Australian Defense Force over a ten-year period. In the first quarter of
2004, this spending plan was revised to add A$11.1 billion of new projects. In this case I
recorded the present discounted value of the amount of the new projects as a positive shock
in the first quarter of 2004. I do not retroactively edit the value of defnews for the second
quarter of 2001, as this future change would have been unknown at the time of the original
announcement.
The overwhelming majority of media reports for all nations outside of Australia are
searched via Dow Jones’ Factiva database.3 The Factiva subscription I used provided access
to more than thirty years of media coverage from thousands of news sources in more than
twenty languages. Data from Australia was found using the ProQuest Australia & New
Zealand newsstand database, a collection of more than thirty national and regional media
sources. Although the database used for gathering data in Australia is different, each of the
sources used to create values of the defnews variable for Australia is available in Factiva. I
believe it is reasonable to assume that this idiosyncrasy in the data gathering process for
Australia has no material effect on the results.
The process of querying these databases for the news reports needed to generate defnews
involved developing a set of keywords or search terms, selecting a time frame in which to
search, and selecting a collection of news sources to inspect. I describe this process in greater
detail below.
The search terms used in conjunction with the databases mentioned above are listed in
3A small number (less than twenty) of news articles in the earliest years of the sample were found using
the ProQuest Newsstand database rather than Factiva. Since the publication coverage of the two databases
is very similar, it is unlikely this small inconsistency has any impact on the quality of the data or results.
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Table 2.1. In Italy and France, the media reports we examined were printed primarily in
terms of those countries’ official languages. I translated the English versions of my key-
words word-for-word into Italian and French using Google Translate. The Google Translate
technology built into the Google Chrome web browser made reading these foreign language
news articles quite easy. I occasionally came across phrases in the news articles that Google
Translate was unable to translate back to English, as well as some idiomatic expressions
whose English translation seemed illogical, but given my emphasis on corroborating across
multiple sources, I do not believe this affects my results.
I searched my sample period in smaller intervals, often years, to break up the sample into
pieces where it was easier to clue in on the flow of spending announcements and government
actions in each nation. At several points in the sample, circumstances occurring in a par-
ticular country (e.g., a terrorist attack at home or in a neighboring country) concentrated
the debate over spending proposals and military buildups in that nation around these high
profile events. In these situations, I narrowed the search to a shorter period immediately
following these high profile events to more carefully determine what actions, if any, were
taken to change government spending levels.4
For each of the five countries in which I used Dow Jones’ Factiva database to find news
articles, each time a search was initiated I was required to select news sources to query. The
publications selected are listed in Table 2.2. In each nation, I chose the two most widely
circulated (as measured by daily volume) national broadsheet newspapers plus, depending
on the nation, between one and three additional media sources. These additional sources
may be other national newspapers (as in the case of the U.S., the U.K., and Italy), local
newspapers (Canada), or newswire services (France). For Australia, the ProQuest Australia
& New Zealand newsstand database searches its entire directory of media sources without
requiring input from the user. For the U.S. defnews series, I use Ramey’s data and augment
it by adding civil defense-related spending announcements that occur during the sample
4An example of this would be France and the United Kingdom in the weeks following the July 7, 2005,
London Underground bombings.
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period.5 No adjustments are made to Ramey’s values of defnews, and I add only civil
defense expenditures that are not already included in Ramey’s data.6
I collected fifty-four quarters of defnews data for each nation in the panel. Of the 324
total country-quarter values, 119 are non-zero, meaning that over one-third of these country-
quarters contain some announcement of defense and/or civil defense spending. Summary
statistics for the defnews variable are given in Table 2.3. Graphs of the defnews time series
for each nation are shown in Figure 2.1. All of the spending amounts, time frames, an-
nouncements, dates, and the sources used in constructing defnews are available in the data
appendix.7
At several points in the data collection process I was forced to make judgment calls
about the amounts or horizons for new spending plans, or regarding revisions to previously
announced spending initiatives. The need to make these assumptions is the result of conflict-
ing and incomplete news reports that are inconsistent in the ways they report expenditure
announcements. It is often the case that the currency amounts appearing in headlines or
the first few sentences of a news article contain amounts that include previously announced
spending totals or aspects of spending programs that are not relevant to this analysis. Occa-
sionally news articles will disclose large budget amounts without any further breakdown of
what these figures include. Failure to further investigate these general accounts could dilute
the accuracy of the defnews variable. I mitigate this by checking multiple news articles for
more detailed accounts, which I often find, although in several situations I am left to make
assumptions about spending totals in the absence of clear information.8 When they exist, I
also consult official sources and budget documents for further clarification. I test the sensi-
tivity of the results to misinformation and errors in judgment by introducing measurement
error into the values for defnews, similar to Ramey (2011). I find that it does not have a
5The Ramey data run through the end of 2013. I create 2014 data according to the same process as the
other nations.
6Ramey’s defnews series available at http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~vramey/research/Ramey_News_US.
xlsx.
7Please contact the author for these details.
8All assumptions are disclosed in the data appendix. Please contact the author for details.
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material impact on my findings.
2.4 Empirical Methodology
2.4.1 Model and Data
The goal of this empirical analysis is to determine the representative effects of changes in
government spending on output, interest rates, consumption, unemployment, and the real
wage. The data I have gathered are used in a panel VAR model similar to those discussed
in Canova and Ciccarelli (2013). The nations in the panel are modern economies whose
contributions to the global economy are significant. They are also nations in which we are
likely to continue to see changes in government spending manifested in ways identical to
what I have identified via defnews. To the extent that policymakers all over the world are
concerned with global events in the context of near-term spending choices and economic
forecasts, knowledge of the representative effects of expenditure changes reduces uncertainty
in their decision-making process.
My model uses quarterly data from seven macroeconomic variables: the present dis-
counted value of defense and civil defense news as a percentage of lagged nominal GDP
(defnews), log of real government spending (rgov), log of real GDP (gdp), a three-month
interbank rate adjusted for inflation (tmo), log of private final consumption expenditures
(consume), unemployment rates for all persons age fifteen and older (unempl), and the log
of an hourly index for manufacturing earnings (wage). All data other than defnews are
collected from the OECD Main Economic Indicators database.9 defnews is constructed ac-
cording to the previous section. For each nation, the nominal GDP figures used to construct
defnews are adjusted by the respective GDP deflator to generate quarterly real GDP.10 Real
government spending figures are generated by adjusting nominal government expenditures
9I obtained the data via the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data)
database.
102009 is the base year.
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using the GDP deflator.11 A nominal three-month interbank rate is adjusted using the GDP
deflator annual rate of change to create a real interest rate. The other three variables are
unadjusted from their original form other than taking logs.12 These variables and their units
are described in Table 2.4.
The panel VAR model pools observations from each nation. The resulting structure is
similar to traditional VAR models that do not use panel data. Before aggregating across
countries and time periods, the model is shown in (4.1). Column vector yt contains current
period (period t) values of defnews, rgov, gdp, tmo, consume, unempl, and wage for nation i.
Four quarters of lagged values of yt are included.13 A constant term a and dummy variables
ci for individual countries are also included. For each nation i = 1, . . . , N , and for each time
period t = 1, . . . , T :








t−4β4 + ci + u
′
t. (2.1)
To pool these data, I aggregate y′t, y′t−j, and u′t over t into yt,i, yt−j,i, and ut,i, each of























I then combine each individual country’s data into an aggregate sample. This step creates
a representative economy. Each country’s yt,i, yt−j,i, and ut,i are stacked to form Y, X, and
11Nominal government expenditure data for Australia is not available. Instead, I use real government
expenditure data and adjust it to be consistent with the other nations.
12The unemployment rate in France is calculated by dividing the population of unemployed persons age
fifteen and older by the working age population ages fifteen to sixty-four. Only annual estimates of the latter
quantity are available before 2003, so we assume that the quarterly figures are the same as the annual figures
in these periods.
13AIC and BIC lag selection tests were done for models with lags of one, two, three, and four quarters.
Calculations indicated that four lags are marginally better than one, two, or three lags.
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The matrix D contains the country dummy variables to be used as additional regressors.





where D1 = IN−1 ⊗ ιT has dimension (N − 1)T × (N − 1) and D2 is a matrix of zeros with
dimension T × (N − 1). IN−1 is the N − 1 square identity matrix and ιT is a T × 1 vector






the global model can be expressed more compactly as:
Y = X̃B + U. (2.2)
The matrix B contains coefficients for four lagged values of each variable, the constant
term, and the coefficients on the dummy variables for the N − 1 nations. Data from all
six (N = 6) nations enter as both independent and dependent variables in (4.2). This is in
contrast to other panel VAR studies (Love and Zicchino (2006) and Ciccarelli, Maddaloni,
and Peydró (2013)) that divide the cross section into subgroups and estimate coefficients
conditional on these subgroups. The sample period runs from the third quarter of 2001 to
the fourth quarter of 2014. Also, the panel is balanced: accounting for lags, the dataset
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contains fifty (T = 50) quarters of data for each nation, generating an overall sample of 300
observations.
2.4.2 Prior Selection and Estimation
The classical method of estimating a panel VAR with fixed effects, pooled observations,
and finite T is the generalized method of moments approach detailed in Arellano and Bond
(1991). This technique requires differencing all variables in the model. Given the stacked
nature of the data, differencing each variable for each nation in the panel would result in a
loss of nearly ten percent of the sample. Since each country-quarter value of the one-of-a-kind
defnews variable contains critical information about the the nature of unanticipated changes
in defense spending, I turn to Bayesian methods to estimate the model without sacrificing
data.
My seven-variable, four-lag VAR model contains over 200 parameters. Bayesian methods
reduce the problem of finding point estimates for each element of B to selecting a small
number of hyperparameters based the type of data in the system. The Bayesian principle
updates the non-sample information contained in the prior with the explanatory power of
defnews and my panel dataset to generate a posterior distribution that is used to analyze
relationships between government spending and consumption, wages, and interest rates. The
Normal-Wishart prior is used to estimate the model. This prior is a conjugate prior for the
multivariate normal distribution, so both the prior and posterior distributions of the VAR
coefficients are multivariate normal. The Normal-Wishart prior extends the Minnesota prior
of Litterman (1986) by eliminating the assumption of a fixed diagonal variance-covariance
matrix for the residuals ut while maintaining computational simplicity. Direct sampling from
the posterior is possible without use of Gibbs sampling or approximation techniques.
In describing the Normal-Wishart prior, I follow the notation used in Koop and Korobilis
(2010).14 The Normal-Wishart prior has the form
14I adapt the code found at http://personal.strath.ac.uk/gary.koop/bayes_matlab_code_by_koop_
and_korobilis.html to estimate the model.
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α|Σ ∼ N (α,Σ⊗ V ) (2.3)
where
Σ−1 ∼ W (S−1, ν). (2.4)
with N and W denoting the multivariate normal and Wishart distributions, respectively.
In (4.3), α = vec(B) from the global model in (4.2). α, V , S, and ν are hyperparameters
whose values are chosen as follows. α contains the prior means for the coefficients on the
explanatory variables. Per Litterman (1986), I assign prior coefficient means based on the
way each variable is measured. Variables measured in levels or log-levels are assumed to follow
a random walk pattern. The initial values of the coefficients for each variable measured in
levels or log-levels are one on the first own lag and zero elsewhere. For defnews, measured
as a percentage of lagged nominal GDP, the prior mean on all coefficients is set to zero. The
prior means of non-lagged variables (the constant and country dummies) are also set to zero.
To construct the prior variance-covariance matrix V , I proceed according to Karlsson
(2013) and choose a vector of three hyperparameters π = (π1, π3, π4).15 π1 controls overall
prior tightness. As π1 decreases in value, it increases the probability weight on the prior
(relative to the likelihood function) in constructing the posterior distribution. π3 controls
the speed at which lagged values are shrunk to zero. As π3 increases, the values of longer
lagged variables have less probability weight in constructing the posterior distribution. π4
controls the probability weight assigned to values of deterministic variables (the constant
terms in A0). I assign a very large probability weight to the information in the sample for
the deterministic variables. Benchmark parameter settings for π are (.2, 2, 100,000). These
settings are derived from initial values suggested in Canova (2007). I test several additional
sets of hyperparameters that assign different levels of probability weight to the prior and
sample information. These settings are described in Table 2.5. I do not modify the value
15π2 controls the relative tightness on own lagged variables versus lags of other variables. In this imple-
mentation of the Normal-Wishart prior, this value is normalized to one.
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of π4 in any hyperparameter specifications given the lack of theoretical motivation in the
literature for doing so.
S and ν initialize the distribution from which the variance-covariance matrix Σ is drawn.
The initial value for S is a diagonal matrix. Estimates of these diagonal entries come from
univariate autoregressive models for each independent variable. I regress current period
values of each independent variable on four quarters of own lagged values and a constant.
The estimates of the error variance from each of these regressions form the entries of S. ν
represents the degrees of freedom of the prior and is constructed according to Kadiyala and
Karlsson (1997). In this model, ν = 9.
Applying Bayes’ rule yields a multivariate normal posterior distribution from which I
draw values of the coefficients in (4.2). The posterior has the form
α|Σ ∼ N (ᾱ,Σ⊗ V̄ ) (2.5)
where
Σ−1|y ∼ W (S̄−1, ν̄). (2.6)
V̄ , B̄, S̄, and ν̄ are constructed analytically as follows:
V̄ = [V −1 + X̃′X̃]−1
B̄ = V̄ [V −1B + X̃′X̃B̂]
S̄ = S + S + B̂′X̃′X̃B̂ + B′V −1B− B̄′V −1 + (X̃′X̃)B̄
ν̄ = NT + ν.
(2.7)
In (4.5), ᾱ = vec(B̄). In (4.7), B is formed by transforming α from a vector back into a
matrix (i.e. back into the shape of B), and S = (Y − X̃B̂)′(Y − X̃B̂), where B̂ is the OLS
estimate of B.16
The structural shocks of the model are identified using a Choleski decomposition on Σ.
16Koop and Korobilis (2010), Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997), or Karlsson (2013) provide complete mathe-
matical derivations of the items in (4.5), (4.6), (4.7).
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I examine the responses of each variable and describe the results below.
2.5 Results and Interpretation
The impulse responses shown in Figures 2.2 to 2.8 are calculated by drawing coefficient val-
ues from the posterior distribution. On each set of axes I plot the median response from
10,000 posterior draws of α along with sixty-eight percent confidence bands.17 Figure 2.2
shows the responses of each variable to a one percent shock to defnews using the benchmark
hyperparameter settings. I find that a one percent increase in the present discounted value
of defense and civil defense spending announcements leads to a significant increase in real
government spending after approximately two quarters, with peak response approximately
five quarters after the shock. This delay between the defnews shock and the observed in-
crease in government spending speaks to the timing challenges described in Ramey (2011).
Policy and implementation lags account for differences in the results of empirical studies
identifying shocks with the traditional VAR approach versus military buildups and the nar-
rative approach. The defnews variable captures the effects of government spending changes
by pinpointing the initial mention of expenditure changes.
I find that the initial response of real GDP is negative. The real interest rate rises
sharply on impact. Consumption decreases on impact and is significantly negative after
approximately five quarters. Unemployment falls slightly on impact and increases steadily
for six to eight quarters thereafter. Wages fall on impact but do not vary much over the
five-year period after the defnews shock. The initial decline in GDP is likely due to the
immediate decrease in consumption following an increase in government spending. For each
of the six nations, consumption makes up the largest portion of output. Combined with the
immediate decreases in wages and the unemployment rate, the results show modest evidence
of the negative wealth effect predicted by the neoclassical model: upon hearing of future
17These confidence bands are constructed by plotting the 16th and 84th percentiles of the responses of
each variable to defnews shocks.
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increases in government spending, households reduce consumption and work more.
The gradual rise in the unemployment rate shown in these results is consistent with the
neoclassical model’s prediction that households supply more labor. Households supplying
more labor means that some portion of these households is likely to be re-entering the labor
force but unable to find immediate work. The sharp increase in interest rates may temper
firms’ demand for additional workers given the tightness in the loanable funds market that
could be generated by increases in government spending financed by borrowing. Ideally, I
would use data measuring hours worked to more firmly establish an increase in household
labor supply, but these data are not available for all nations in the panel. This also has
implications for wages, which do not respond meaningfully to the defnews shock. This could
the result of wage stickiness or the fact that my measure of changes in labor market supply
is somewhat of an approximation.
With the decline in the interest rate after its initial rise, the model may be capturing
increases in saving by households. This spike in savings, which is consistent with the decline
in consumption and GDP over the same period, may be the result of the uncertainty asso-
ciated with the geopolitical events that generate many of the spending changes captured by
defnews. As interest rates return to pre-shock levels, GDP and consumption begin to rise
and unemployment falls.
The lack of significant responses throughout Figures 2.2 to 2.8 may be a product of the
types of government spending identified via defnews. Defense and civil defense expenditures
are more likely to be temporary relative to non-defense government spending for social pro-
grams or infrastructure. Indeed, Barro (1981) comments that military spending is temporary
in nature. A significant portion of the spending done by Australia, Canada, the U.K., and
the U.S. in the early years of my sample is related to these nations’ role in the post-9/11
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. If the changes in defense and civil defense spending I
have identified with defnews are temporary, this may explain the lack of significant impulse
responses. Baxter and King (1993) find that the response of output to changes in govern-
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ment spending is smaller when the government spending changes are temporary. Aiyagari,
Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1992) describe the response of output and unemployment to
transitory movements in government expenditures as “small.” Additionally, Aiyagari, Chris-
tiano, and Eichenbaum (1992) find that for both temporary and permanent changes to
government spending, the response of the real interest rate is very small.
The negative movement in output following shocks to defnews could also be a consequence
of the ways in which defense and civil defense news shocks are financed. Unfortunately
there is not sufficient detail in the news articles used to construct defnews to determine
whether new spending is financed by borrowing or taxes. In the latter case, the type of taxes
levied may influence households’ labor supply and consumption decisions. Baxter and King
(1993) note that the lump-sum tax versus distortionary tax choice facing policymakers has
substantial implications for empirical research. They find that output falls in response to
government spending financed by income taxes since households are less willing to supply
labor when the after-tax returns are lower. In several of the precedent empirical studies
mentioned above, including Ramey (2011), marginal tax rates are included as a control for
tax changes. Regrettably, data of this sort is not available for all of the nations in my panel.
Figures 2.3 to 2.7 show the impulse responses of the seven variables under different
hyperparameter settings described in Table 2.5. The hyperparameters in these cases adjust
overall prior tightness as well as the probability weight assigned to values of lagged variables.
I find that the responses under each of these settings are nearly identical to those of the
benchmark case. Figures 2.5 to 2.7 show impulse responses using an alternative version of
α, the matrix of prior coefficient means. For this alternative version of α, those variables
that have prior means of one on the first own lag also have prior means of .75, .5, and .25
on the second, third, and fourth own lags, respectively. This specification reflects a belief
that these variables exhibit a stronger degree of persistence than the random walk model
captures. I again find that the results are robust to these new hyperparameter settings.
Out of concern for errors in assumptions or other mistakes made during the data gathering
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process for defense and civil defense news, I test the sensitivity of my results to measurement
error in defnews. I follow the procedure laid out in the appendix of Ramey (2011). This
procedure adjusts the value of defnews in each quarter to account for mistiming by one
quarter, past or future, of up to twenty percent of that quarter’s value for defnews. This
procedure simultaneously allows the value of defnews to be overestimated or underestimated
by twenty percent. These responses are shown in Figure 2.8. They indicate that adding
measurement error to defnews has little effect on the variable responses.
As an additional robustness check, I also test a smaller version of the model containing
only five independent variables at a time. This reduction in the number of variables affects
the nature of the multivariate normal posterior distribution from which the coefficients are
drawn. In this specification I include the core variables defnews, rgov, gdp, and tmo with
each of consume, unempl, and wage rotated in one at a time. Additionally, I test a model
with all seven variables that also contains dummy variables marking the quarters spanning
the global financial crisis. These dummy variables account for any idiosyncrasies particular
to the periods from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009. All of these
alternative specifications have no material effects on the results.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
Determining causality in the macroeconomy is a tall task for empirical research. In the
absence of model economies or households willing to be the subjects of field experiments,
the narrative approach is well-equipped to help establish some degree of cause and effect
in the global macroeconomy. In the government spending literature, using the narrative
approach can insulate researchers from questionable identifying assumptions of structural
VAR analyses focusing on variation in total government spending. The Bayesian principle of
combining a prior distribution with sample information is an intuitive method of weighing
beliefs about the nature of macroeconomic data with a rich, unique dataset. I find moderate
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evidence in favor of the neoclassical growth model’s prediction of a negative wealth effect that
follows increases in government spending. Estimates of the response of output to government
spending shocks indicate a value of the fiscal multiplier that is non-positive and close to zero.
According to my results, policymakers eyeing fiscal policy as a tool to increase economic
growth should carefully consider other options.
The degree of uncertainty that geopolitical events over the last fifteen years have injected
into optimizing decisions of households may have significant consequences for the responses
of macroeconomic variables to increases in government purchases. As Bloom (2009) has
found, uncertainty shocks – which may be a side effect of the forces driving the changes in
government spending identified via defnews – have substantial implications for employment
and output. At any rate, the questions answered here are central to further empirical and
theoretical study of advanced economies. Macroeconomists can safely assume that they will
continue to be the subject of inquiry and exploration.
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Country Keywords
Australia australia AND (million OR billion) AND (defence OR military) AND
(spending OR budget)
Canada (million OR billion) AND (defence OR military OR security) AND
(spending OR budget)
France (securite OR terrorisme OR depenses) AND (defense OR militaire)
Italy (milioni OR miliardi) AND (difesa OR militari OR sicurezza) AND
(spesa OR bilancio)
United Kingdom (million OR billion) AND (defence OR military OR security) AND
(spending OR budget)
United States (million OR billion) AND (defense OR military OR security) AND
(spending OR budget)
Table 2.1: Search terms used to construct the defnews variable
Country News Sources Searched
Canada The Globe and Mail*, National Post*, Ottawa Citizen, Toronto Star,
Vancouver Sun
France Le Figaro*, Le Monde*, Agence French Presse
Italy Corriere della Sera*, La Repubblica*, La Stampa
United Kingdom The Daily Telegraph*, The Times*, Financial Times, The Guardian,
The Independent
United States The Wall Street Journal*, The New York Times*, Washington Post,
USA Today
Table 2.2: Media sources used in searches for spending announcements
Note: Starred sources are the top two most widely circulated national broadsheet
newspapers in each respective country. Australia data is from ProQuest Australia & New
Zealand newsstand database and requires no specifically named news sources to search.
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Variable # Obs. # Non-zero # > |1%| # > |2%| Min Max
Australia 54 19 13 9 -5.8% 30.6%
Canada 54 22 9 6 -4.6% 4.7%
France 54 10 6 3 -0.3% 33.7%
Italy 54 21 1 1 -0.6% 2.3%
United Kingdom 54 27 8 2 -0.3% 6.3%
United States 54 20 16 12 -11.9% 20.3%
Table 2.3: Summary statistics for defnews variable
Variable Description
defnews PDV of defense/civil defense spending as a percent of lagged nominal GDP
gov Log of real government expenditures
rgdp Log of real GDP
tmo Three-month interbank rates, adjusted for inflation
consume Log of private final consumption expenditures
unempl Unemployment rate of working population, age fifteen and up
wage Log of manufacturing hourly wage index
Table 2.4: Variable definitions
Hyperparameter settings Description (relative to benchmark case πb)
πb = [.2, 2, 100, 000] Moderate tightness; inspired by Karlsson (2013) and
Canova (2010)
πi = [.8, 2, 100, 000] More loose on coefficients; more weight given to sample
data
πii = [.05, 2, 100, 000] Tightest hyperparameter settings; most weight given to
prior information
πiii = [.2, 1, 100, 000] Moderate tightness; assigns more weight to lagged values
πiv = [.8, 1, 100, 000] Loose prior; assigns more weight to lagged values
πv = [.05, 1, 100, 000] Tight prior; assigns more weight to lagged values
Table 2.5: Hyperparameter settings for model estimation
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Figure 2.1: Plots of time series of defnews
Period is 3Q01 to 4Q14. defnews is measured as the present discounted value of the
spending announcement as a percentage of the previous quarter’s nominal GDP.
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Figure 2.2: Responses to 1% shock to defnews with hyperparameter settings πb
Prior coefficient means set to one on the first own lag and zeros elsewhere for all variables
other than defnews, whose prior mean is zero everywhere. Sixty-eight percent confidence
bands shown.
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Figure 2.3: Responses to 1% shock to defnews with hyperparameter settings πi
Prior coefficient means set to one on the first own lag and zeros elsewhere for all variables
other than defnews, whose prior mean is zero everywhere. Sixty-eight percent confidence
bands shown.
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Figure 2.4: Responses to 1% shock to defnews with hyperparameter settings πii
Prior coefficient means set to one on the first own lag and zeros elsewhere for all variables
other than defnews, whose prior mean is zero everywhere. Sixty-eight percent confidence
bands shown.
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Figure 2.5: Responses to 1% shock to defnews with hyperparameter settings πiii
Prior coefficient means set to 1, .75, .5, and .25 on the first, second, third, and fourth own
lags (zeros elsewhere) for all variables other than defnews. Prior mean of defnews is zero
everywhere. Sixty-eight percent confidence bands shown.
51









Response of DEFNEWS (% lag GDP)












Response of GOV SPEND (log)










Response of GDP (log)









Response of INT RATE (bps)










Response of CONSUME (log)










Response of UNEMPL (bps)









Response of WAGE (index)
Figure 2.6: Responses to 1% shock to defnews with hyperparameter settings πiv
Prior coefficient means set to 1, .75, .5, and .25 on the first, second, third, and fourth own
lags (zeros elsewhere) for all variables other than defnews. Prior mean of defnews is zero
everywhere. Sixty-eight percent confidence bands shown.
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Figure 2.7: Responses to 1% shock to defnews with hyperparameter settings πv
Prior coefficient means set to 1, .75, .5, and .25 on the first, second, third, and fourth own
lags (zeros elsewhere) for all variables other than defnews. Prior mean of defnews is zero
everywhere. Sixty-eight percent confidence bands shown.
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Figure 2.8: Responses to 1% shock to defnews with hyperparameter settings πb
defnews variable contains measurement error. Prior coefficient means set to one on the first
lag and zeros elsewhere for all variables other than defnews, whose prior mean is zero
everywhere. Sixty-eight percent confidence bands shown.
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Chapter 3
Does Family Labor Supply Explain the
Increase in Unemployment Duration?
3.1 Recent Developments in Labor Markets
A question central to economists’ understanding of labor demand and labor supply is the
relationship between the unemployment rate and unemployment duration. Headline mea-
sures of unemployment (i.e., the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ “U3”) are widely reported and
scrutinized, but improvement in the aggregate unemployment rate can be achieved in spite
of individuals whose unemployment spells drag on. Failure to account for these individuals
may lead policymakers to overstate the health of the economy and turn their attention away
from workers who face significant challenges in re-entering the labor market.
Abraham and Shimer (2002) document the evolving relationship between unemployment
duration and unemployment rates in the United States. As unemployment rates rose in the
1970s, fluctuation in mean unemployment duration mirrored overall changes in unemploy-
ment rates into the early 1980s. Later in the decade, as the economy entered the 1990s, un-
employment rates declined despite persistently high unemployment duration, each of which
continued into the 2000s. The recessions of 2001 and 2007 to 2009 were marked by long
55
recoveries and protracted unemployment durations. At the end of 2015, the headline un-
employment rate had fallen to near five percent, in line with levels seen prior to the Great
Recession. Mean unemployment duration, however, hovered around twenty-eight weeks –
well above pre-2007 levels of seventeen weeks.
Concurrent with the the decoupling of unemployment rates and unemployment duration
have been changes in family labor supply driven primarily by the entrance of women into
the labor force. Blau and Kahn (2007) chronicle the rise in labor force participation of
women over the period since the end of World War II until the year 2000. Labor supply of
married women, along with women’s real wages, increased significantly during the last two
decades of the twentieth century. Women’s labor force participation rose from thirty-one
percent in 1947 to over sixty percent in 2001. Declining own-wage labor supply elasticities
and continued efforts to close the gender pay gap are likely to have positive effects on the
participation of women in the labor force.
We use data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (the March supplement)
of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to examine the effects of spousal employment and
family labor supply on unemployment duration and labor force status over the last three
decades in the United States. We match data from individual CPS records to create measures
of spouse wages, spousal employment, and family non-labor income. We use a proportional
hazards model to calculate how these measures affect the length of unemployment spells
and the likelihood of re-entering employment versus the likelihood of exiting the labor force.
Despite our hypothesis that family labor income is used to subsidize long spells of unemploy-
ment, our results indicate that spousal employment does not decrease the hazard rates of
exit from unemployment. This is the case for either exit to re-employment or exit from the
labor force. These results hold after we separate the sample by gender and control for a host
of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, including unearned income and receipt of
unemployment insurance.
We proceed as follows. Section 3.2 reviews several corners of the existing literature
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on unemployment duration and labor supply. Section 3.3 motivates this analysis using a
collective labor supply model in which couples share income and individual labor supply
decisions are influenced by the spouse’s wage. Section 3.4 describes our data and empirical
methodology in detail. Section 3.5 discusses our findings and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related Research from the Macro and Micro Litera-
tures
This work contributes to both the macroeconomic and microeconomic literature by address-
ing unemployment duration, the added worker effect, and family labor supply. We describe
the outstanding research on each topic below.
The dynamics of unemployment duration give policymakers information about the nature
of unemployment. A decrease in headline unemployment rates in the face of unchanging or
rising mean unemployment duration signals a substantial degree of long-term involuntary
employment in the population rather than short-term frictional unemployment or movement
in and out of the labor force. Changes in unemployment duration can have positive or
negative effects on unemployed workers. Welfare is likely to fall if workers are risk-averse
and increases in unemployment duration place additional uninsurable labor-income risk on
workers. Long-term unemployment may place downward pressure on wages as chronically
unemployed workers see their skills and job networks deteriorate. Workers may lower their
reservation wage in hopes of ending their unemployment spell. On the other hand, if labor-
income risks are self-insured through labor force participation by family or household mem-
bers, this type of consumption smoothing could facilitate labor force attachment for long
periods of time until workers find suitable job matches.
Abraham and Shimer (2002), Valletta (1998), and Valletta (2005) explore changes in the
relationship between unemployment duration and unemployment rates since the late 1970s
and find upward trends in unemployment duration. Abraham and Shimer attribute them
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to the a variety of factors. They find that a redesign of the Current Population Survey
contributed by increasing mean unemployment duration by about half a week. Demographic
changes in the U.S. population (primarily due to aging of baby boomers) place larger seg-
ments of the population into groups that experience longer unemployment spells. They also
find that much of the overall rise in unemployment duration, particularly for women, is the
result of increasing female labor force attachment and growing stability of female employ-
ment. Valletta (1998, 2005) attribute much of the recent rise in unemployment duration to
increases in permanent job loss and struggles of labor force entrants in finding work. Valletta
(2005) acknowledges the role of rising female labor force attachment, but notes that accel-
erated increases in unemployment duration during the second half of the 1990s – a period
in which women’s labor force behavior had converged to be similar to that of men (see also
Blau and Kahn (2007)) – casts doubt on some of the findings of Abraham and Shimer.
As the global economy entered the Great Recession of the late 2000s, the average duration
of unemployment spells in the United States reached all-time highs. By January 2010,
mean unemployment duration was thirty weeks; in July 2011, a peak of forty weeks was
reached. Aaronson, Mazumder, and Schechter (2010) estimate that about half of this run-up
can be explained by the demographic changes highlighted by Abraham and Shimer. They
also acknowledge extreme weakness in labor demand and, to a limited extent, expansion
of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits at the state and federal levels as contributing
factors. They show that lengthy unemployment spells are self-reinforcing: in a given period,
individuals mired in long stretches of unemployment are less likely to find jobs in the next
period. These would-be workers often remain unemployed long into the recovery.
The relationship between unemployment insurance and unemployment duration has been
studied empirically by Moffitt (1985) and Meyer (1990). Each finds that the hazard rate
of unemployment exit decreases when unemployment benefits rise. Chetty (2008) expands
on these findings and describes how liquidity constraints affect unemployment search. Con-
strained workers who have greater difficulty smoothing consumption during unemployment
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spells reduce the urgency of their job search and use unemployment benefits to relax liquidity
constraints. (Gruber (1997) finds that the unemployed make significant use of unemploy-
ment insurance for consumption smoothing.) Constrained workers are identified as those
without working spouses and/or making mortgage payments. For unemployed workers that
are not liquidity constrained, increases in unemployment duration after receiving benefits
are related to the traditional moral hazard problem of reducing the cost of leisure. Over-
all, Chetty finds that approximately sixty percent of the marginal effects of unemployment
benefits are related to liquidity concerns.
The severity of the economic downtown in 2007 to 2009 prompted expansion of unem-
ployment insurance programs. Through the federal government’s Extended Benefits and
Emergency Unemployment Compensation programs, in the months during and after the
Great Recession, workers were eligible for unemployment benefits for as long as ninety-nine
weeks. UI eligibility requirements determined at the state level were expanded differently
according to individual legislatures. Numerous papers have used these developments as mo-
tivation for new research. In several cases, researchers have used changes to UI to develop
natural experiments centered around policy interventions. Farber and Valletta (2015) esti-
mate the effects of benefit extensions on unemployment duration by creating a database of
UI program dates and benefit levels across states. Information about maximum benefits,
eligibility requirements, and dates of policy changes are used to generate indicator variables
for extended benefits and periods in which an individual is in the last month of extended
UI eligibility. They show that extended UI benefits reduce unemployment exits, a reflec-
tion of increased labor force attachment rather than reduced job finding. UI extensions are
estimated to have small impacts on the aggregate labor market, increasing headline unem-
ployment by less than half a percentage point. Howell and Azizoglu (2011) match this finding
and posit that any increase in unemployment stemming from UI extensions is a reflection of
workers remaining attached to the labor force for longer periods of time rather than enjoying
higher incentives for leisure.
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Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman (2013) focus on the responses of job and
vacancy creation to expansion of unemployment benefits. In theory, expanded UI bene-
fits lead workers to demand higher wages, shrinking firm profits and reducing the number of
vacancies. They exploit state-by-state differences by comparing data from neighboring coun-
ties that belong to different states. Results indicate that UI extensions generate negative
responses of vacancy creation and employment that are larger than the positive microeco-
nomic effects related to worker attachment and job acceptance. The authors also find that
counties with longer durations of unemployment benefits have higher unemployment levels.
Rothstein (2011) uses CPS data to identify the effects of UI extentions on unemployment
duration during the Great Recession. To address endogeneity concerns about the impact
of poor labor market conditions on the emergence of UI benefit extensions, Rothstein uses
UI-ineligible workers as a control group and accounts for state-specific economic conditions
to identify the effects of benefit extensions. Rothstein concludes that availability of extended
UI benefits has small negative effects on hazard rates of exit from unemployment. The anal-
ysis suggests that both the headline unemployment rate and the long-term unemployment
rate would have been lower by 0.2 and 1.6 percentage points, respectively, in the absence
of extended unemployment benefits. Similar findings are reported in Fujita (2011) using
monthly CPS data and in Nakajima (2011) using a structural model. Valletta and Kuang
(2010) argue that extended UE benefits accounted for 0.4 of the more than five percentage
point rise in unemployment during the Great Recession.
Hagedorn, Manovskii, and Mitman (2015) and Farber, Rothstein, and Valletta (2015)
look at UI benefit rollbacks that took place in 2012 and 2013 as Congress ended the Emer-
gency Unemployment Compensation program and states began to reduce UI eligibility. Far-
ber, Rothstein, and Valletta (2015) estimate hazards of exit from unemployment in two
periods with very different labor market conditions: 2008 to 2011 and 2012 to mid-2014.
They find that extended UI benefits have significant negative effects on exits from employ-
ment to non-participation in the labor force. Hagedorn, Manovskii, and Mitman (2015)
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revisit their identification strategy of using data from adjacent counties sitting across state
borders. They view the termination of extended UI benefits at the federal level as exogenous
to state economic conditions and exploit discontinuities stemming from variation in state
maximum UI benefit duration that remained after the federal policy change. They conclude
that employment growth was higher in counties belonging to states where the decline in
benefits was was larger than their neighbors. They suggest that the increases in employment
are large enough to account for a majority of overall employment growth in the U.S. in 2014
and provide evidence that the response of employment to UI benefit reduction is positive.
This paper also adds to the literature describing the added worker effect. This term
refers to the labor supply responses of married women to husband job loss (specifically, the
propensity of wives to enter the labor force when their husbands become unemployed). This
concept has been discussed at length in the labor economics literature, notably in Heckman
and MaCurdy (1980) and Lundberg (1985). Lundberg (1985) finds a small positive response
of female labor supply to husband job loss using household data from 1969 to 1973. Juhn
and Potter (2007) use March CPS data from 1968 to 2005 to study labor market transitions
of wives relative to their husbands’ labor supply. They define the added worker effect as the
difference between the probability of entering the labor force among wives whose husbands
exit employment and the probability of entering the labor force among wives whose husbands
remain employed. Their results suggest that the added worker effect remains relevant for
some couples, but the that overall added worker effect has diminished since the 1990s due to
sharp decreases in the number of wives not already employed. Mattingly and Smith (2010)
find that the added worker effect was significantly larger during the Great Recession relative
to the period leading up the the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. Over the same period, Starr
(2014) also finds significant increases in the probability of entering employment for wives
with unemployed husbands. These probabilities were highest for younger wives and wives
with non-adult children in the household. Starr finds evidence of a smaller added worker
effect for husbands whose wives became unemployed during the Great Recession.
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Stephens Jr. (2002) investigates the effects of husband job displacement (rather than
unemployment) on wives’ labor supply responses using Panel Study of Income Dynamics
data. Stephens also looks at changes in spousal employment immediately before and after
displacement occurs, and finds both pre- and post-displacement increases in wives’ labor
supply. Stephens finds that the nature of these responses depends on the magnitude of
wages lost during displacement and the type of displacement (factory closings versus layoffs),
suggesting that information received by couples in advance of and during displacement has
implications for labor supply decisions. Cullen and Gruber (2000) look at the interaction
between the added worker effect and unemployment insurance benefits and examine how
spousal labor supply responds to receipt of non-labor income from unemployment insurance
programs. They use Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data and find
evidence of a substanding “crowding out” effect: if their husbands were not in receipt of UI
benefits, wives’ labor hours would be thirty percent higher. If spousal labor supply serves as
a form of consumption smoothing for couples and families, these results suggest that there
is some degree of substitutability among types of labor income insurance.
Our research also adds to the ongoing discussion about family labor supply and the role
of families as economic decision-making units. Doepke and Tertilt (2016) discuss the impor-
tance of acknowledging how families make saving, investment, consumption, and labor supply
decisions collectively. They argue that macroeconomic models focused on individuals may
be inaccurately representing how agents make choices. Interactions among spouses, parents,
and children, and potentially among families in the same household, have implications for
macroeconomic research. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) provide a comprehensive survey of
family labor supply models and the literature up to the 1990s. Eggleston (2014) introduces
a job search model in which married couples make consumption and labor supply decisions
jointly. Mankart and Oikonomou (2015) develop a model where households are comprised
of couples with primary and secondary earners. The model predicts that secondary earners
participate in the labor market countercyclically, helping explain U.S. data that fail to show
62
overall procyclical labor market participation. The behavior of secondary earners in this
model helps two-member households insure against potential labor income losses. Guler,
Guvenen, and Violante (2012) study how couples jointly search for work and how frictions
unique to dual-earner households present new challenges relative to single-agent searches.
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016) document the importance of family labor
supply as insurance against lost wages and find that over sixty percent of insurance against
male wage loss comes from family labor supply.
3.3 Theoretical Motivation
To show how individual labor supply decisions could be influenced by spousal employment
and wages, we turn to the collective labor supply model of Chiappori (1988, 1992). A two-
adult household consisting of a married couple without children solves a family maximization
problem. Cm and Cf denote male and female private consumption, respectively. Lm and Lf
denote male and female leisure, respectively. The household’s, or family’s, utility is given
by a function W taking individual male and female utilities Um and Uf as arguments. The
collective labor supply problem is to maximize a function that is separable in individual
utilities subject to a household budget constraint:
max W [Um(Cm, Lm), Uf (Cm, Cf )]
s.t. Cm + Cf = M +Wm(T − Lm) +Wf (T − Lf )
(3.1)
where M is non-labor income and T is total hours available for leisure or work. Wm and Wf
denote male and female wages, respectively. Separability of the household utility function in




s.t. Cm = M +Wm(T − Lm)− φ(Wm,Wf ,M)
(3.2)
and
max Uf (Cf , Lf )
s.t. Cf = Wf (T − Lf ) + φ(Wm,Wf ,M).
(3.3)
Chiappori (1992) shows that household decisions are Pareto efficient if and only if a sharing
rule exists. The sharing rule φ appearing in each party’s budget constraint illustrates how
individual labor supply decisions depend on spousal wages in spite of individual utility
functions that depend only on own consumption and leisure.
Using the job search model described in Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005), spousal
income sharing influences the reservation wage Wr. Individuals accept new job offers with






(w −Wr) dF (w) (3.4)






(1− F (w)) dw (3.5)
where b is the benefit of not working, w is the wage associated with a new job offer, α is
the arrival rate of new offers, and r is the interest rate. 1 − F (Wr) gives the probability of
receiving an offer with w ≥ Wr. As a result, multiplication by α gives the hazard rate of exit
from unemployment H = α [(1− F (Wr)]. Since this hazard function is constant over time,
the distribution of employment duration is exponential. Thus, we calculate the expected












By rewriting the equation for the reservation wage given above in (3.5) as





(1− F (w))dw = 0, (3.7)




and see that ∂Wr
∂b
> 0 and ∂D
∂b
> 0. This result
confirms what is expected: as the benefit to not working b increases, so do the reserva-
tion wage and mean unemployment duration. In the collective model, the benefits to not
working depend on the sharing rule. Ignoring the possibility of unemployment insurance or
unemployment benefits, a married man who is not working with a spouse who is employed
receives benefit bm = M − φ(0,Wf ,M). In a single-person household, or if his spouse were
unemployed, this benefit would be simply b = M such that bm > b (note that φ can be
negative). We expect, therefore, that the average unemployment duration of a married man
with an employed spouse is longer than if the man resided in a single person household.
3.4 Data and Empirical Methodology
Our data is from the Annual Social & Economic Supplement (known as the March supple-
ment) of the Current Population Survey, a joint publication of the U.S. Census Bureau and
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The CPS collects labor supply information from surveys
administered to a sample of approximately sixty thousand U.S. households. Each household
is interviewed once a month for four months, and then once a month for four months in the
same period next year. This survey structure – four months in the sample, eight months out,
and four months in the sample again – facilitates month-over-month and year-over-year com-
parisons of weeks worked, hours per week, total income, and income components. The March
supplement also includes work experience, employment status, migration, demographic, and
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occupation/industry information for each individual.
We use information contained in the 1979 to 2012 editions of the March supplement
to study the length and determinants of unemployment spells. Since the labor market
data published in one year actually pertain to the previous calendar year, our data are
retrospective and correspond to the calendar years 1978 to 2011. The labor market metrics of
primary interest to us are an individual’s current labor force status (in or out, and employed
or looking for work), weeks worked, weeks unemployed, and weeks not in the labor force
over the previous year. Similar to Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002), we calculate time
spent working as the number of weeks worked divided by fifty-two. Measures for time spent
unemployed and not in the labor force are developed similarly.
Our measure of unemployment duration is equal to retrospective weeks unemployed for
individuals who are currently employed. For individuals who are not working, unemployment
duration is equal to the maximum of retrospective weeks unemployed and current weeks
unemployed. Individuals may exit unemployment by finding a job or leaving the labor force.
Those that remain unemployed at the end of the survey period are right-censored.
In addition to employment and labor force information, CPS survey respondents also
report labor and non-labor income. We use these data to generate measures of weekly real
wages.1 Non-labor income and income from unemployment insurance programs are also
measured. We link individual records in the CPS data to match spouses and create variables
for spouse wages and spousal employment during the last twelve months. We also extract
demographic information from the survey data for age, ethnicity, education level, home
ownership, number of children, and gender. The sample is restricted to individuals ages
twenty to sixty-four. Summary statistics are shown in Table 3.1.
We use the Cox proportional hazards model to quantify the effects of spouse wages and
spousal employment on unemployment duration. This model allows us to estimate hazard
rates of exit from unemployment given by
1Weekly wages are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index.
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h(t) = h0(t) exp(β1x1 + · · ·+ βkxk) (3.8)
where xi are the covariates mentioned above and h0(t) is the baseline hazard. The two
covariates of primary interest are spouse employed, a dummy variable equal to one if the
individual’s spouse was employed at any point during the last year, and spouse wage, which
is constructed by matching individual records in the CPS data. Once again, our dependent
variable, unemployment duration, is equal to the maximum of current weeks unemployed
(active spells) and retrospective weeks unemployed (completed spells).
Models for exit to re-employment and exit from the labor force are estimated separately.
Dummy variables for recessions in 1975, 1980, 1982, 1991, and 2001 are included in some
specifications, along with interaction terms between these recession periods and dummy
variables for spouse employment in the same period. We also use state fixed effects to
control for differences in state unemployment insurance programs and the nature of state
economies. Owing to papers in the literature by Farber and Valletta (2015) and Fujita
(2011), our control for unemployment insurance is a binary variable that is equal to one
if the individual received unemployment insurance in the last twelve months. Finally, we
include a control for family non-labor income. This variable captures unearned income from
a variety of sources, including veteran payments, worker’s compensation, retirement, and
investment income. We explain our findings in greater detail below.
3.5 Results and Interpretation
Table 3.2 shows estimates of the effects of spousal employment and various demographic and
socioeconomic covariates on the hazard rate of exit to re-employment. In each specification
of the model, the effect of spousal employment on the rate of exit to re-employment is either
zero or positive. This result is inconsistent with our hypothesis that family labor supply
insures against individual labor-income risk and allows unemployed workers to prolong their
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search for work. Estimates of the demographic and socioeconomic covariates, on the other
hand, are rather intuitive: women and blacks are less likely to exit unemployment, whereas
higher levels of education increase the probability of finding work. Individuals who own a
home are also more likely to find work. More children, more nonlabor income, and receipt of
unemployment insurance each decrease the hazard rate of exit from unemployment. The sign
on the unemployment insurance dummy is consistent with a number of papers summarized
in Section 3.2 that find negative effects of unemployment benefits on unemployment exits.
For all covariates, the coefficients and the signficance of the coefficients are largely robust
to model specification, including addition of dummy variables for recession periods, spousal
employment during recession periods, and state fixed effects.
When we separate the sample by gender, the effects of spousal employment are much
stronger for women. These results are shown in Table 3.3. The effects of spousal employment
on exiting unemployment are insignificant for men but strongly significant and positive for
women. Since women are more likely to be secondary earners, this result is surprising. The
signs on the demographic covariates for both men and women are mostly similar to the full
sample. For men, age decreases the likelihood of re-employment. For both sexes, receipt
of unemployment insurance and family non-labor income increase unemployment duration.
The effects of unemployment insurance are stronger for women.
Table 3.4 shows estimates of the effects of spousal employment and other covariates on
the hazard rate of exit from the labor force. In the model with all covariates, we again see
a counterintuitive result in which spousal employment increases the likelihood of exiting the
labor force. If family labor supply allows unemployed workers to extend their job searches
and stay connected to the labor force, we would expect the coefficient on spouse employed
to be less than one. As was the case in Table 3.2, the coefficient on spouse employed either
zero or positive for each specification. Older workers, black workers, and those with college
degrees are less likely to leave the labor force. Women are much more likely than men to leave
the labor force, presumably for family reasons. Individuals with more children are also more
68
likely to leave the labor force. Receipt of unemployment insurance keeps unemployed workers
attached to the labor force, but this is likely to be a response to UI eligibility requirements.
Except for the variable measuring family non-labor income, we again find that the values and
significance of the coefficients are robust to model specification and additional covariates.
Table 3.5 shows estimates of the hazard rate of labor force exit based on gender-specific
subsamples. For both the men-only and women-only subsamples, the coefficients on spouse
employed are not significantly different from zero. Black women are much less likely to exit
the labor force than black men. For men, additional family non-labor income extends un-
employment duration. As we would expect, the number of children has greater implications
for women exiting the labor force than for men. For both sexes, older workers and workers
with bachelor’s degrees are more likely to stay connected to the labor force. The effects of
unemployment insurance are similar for both men and women.
3.6 Conclusion and Future Research
Unemployment rates and unemployment duration are two key labor market metrics that
command the attention of policymakers and economists. The dynamics of unemployment
duration and the labor force have changed dramatically since the end of World War II.
In the early 1950s, mean unemployment duration was around ten weeks and female labor
force participation was less than thirty-five percent. Sixty years later, mean unemployment
duration is upwards of twenty-five weeks, with over fifty percent of women in the labor force.
In this paper we used CPS data and matched individuals to their spouses to determine how
much of the upward trend in the length of unemployment spells can be explained by spousal
employment. We motivated this question using a simple job search model that showed how
individuals with employed spouses could be expected to stay unemployed for longer periods
relative to single individuals and individuals in single-earner households.
After controlling for demographic factors, home ownership, unemployment insurance, and
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non-labor income, our findings do not support the claim that increases in spousal employment
and the large entrance of women into the labor force in recent decades explain the decoupling
of unemployment rates and unemployment duration. However, there are several areas where
we can build on our findings in the near term. First, the period during and immediately after
the Great Recession was characterized by significant changes in unemployment insurance and
unemployment benefit programs. To the extent that these changes – namely, extension of UI
eligibility up to as long as ninety-nine weeks – may have influenced the behavior of job seekers,
this period warrants special consideration. Second, we plan to estimate our model using a
competing risks framework that better manages the difference between unemployment exits
for return to employment or exiting the labor force. Finally, some attention should be paid
to the problem of selection bias and positive assortative mating in couples, an element that
is gathering attention in the public debate over rising income inequality and has been linked
to recent changes in female labor force participation by Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov, and
Santos (2014, 2016).
70
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max
Spouse employed 137,266 0.812 0.391 0 1
Female 137,266 0.417 0.493 0 1
Age 137,266 38.9 11.0 20 64
Black 137,266 0.072 0.259 0 1
HS 137,266 0.398 0.490 0 1
Some college 137,266 0.215 0.411 0 1
Bachelor’s 137,266 0.114 0.318 0 1
Grad 137,266 0.051 0.220 0 1
# of children 137,266 1.296 1.270 0 13
Own home 137,266 0.643 0.479 0 1
UI dummy 137,266 0.274 0.446 0 1
Family non-labor income 136,320 6,212 11,339 0 353,322
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for CPS data
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spouse employed 1.147** 1.043** 1.044** 1.013 1.025*
[0.00967] [0.00924] [0.0107] [0.0104] [0.0106]
Female 0.990 0.973** 0.982** 0.975**
[0.00676] [0.00668] [0.00677] [0.00672]
Age 0.996 1.003 0.997 1.001
[0.00232] [0.00235] [0.00234] [0.00235]
Age2 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000**
[2.87e-05] [2.88e-05] [2.89e-05] [2.90e-05]
Black 0.791** 0.766** 0.760** 0.762**
[0.0103] [0.0104] [0.0103] [0.0103]
HS 1.139** 1.167** 1.179** 1.183**
[0.0103] [0.0107] [0.0108] [0.0109]
Some college 1.244** 1.292** 1.305** 1.317**
[0.0127] [0.0134] [0.0136] [0.0137]
Bachelor’s 1.366** 1.414** 1.448** 1.449**
[0.0163] [0.0171] [0.0177] [0.0177]
Grad 1.405** 1.421** 1.488** 1.470**
[0.0220] [0.0224] [0.0238] [0.0235]
# of children 0.967** 0.969** 0.970** 0.969**
[0.00277] [0.00278] [0.00280] [0.00280]
Own home 1.150** 1.168** 1.184** 1.187**
[0.00850] [0.00879] [0.00898] [0.00900]
UI dummy 0.782** 0.836**
[0.00615] [0.00715]
Family non-labor income 0.970** 0.978**
[0.000932] [0.00102]
Observations 137,266 137,266 137,266 136,320 136,320
Recession FE NO NO YES YES YES
State FE NO NO YES YES YES
seEform in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 3.2: Estimated effects on probability of exit to re-employment, 1979 to 2012
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ALL MEN WOMEN
Spouse employed 1.025* 1.015 1.140**
[0.0106] [0.0118] [0.0276]
Age 1.001 0.993* 1.006
[0.00235] [0.00308] [0.00372]
Age2 1.000** 1.000** 1.000**
[2.90e-05] [3.76e-05] [4.66e-05]
Black 0.762** 0.756** 0.779**
[0.0103] [0.0134] [0.0165]
HS 1.183** 1.179** 1.198**
[0.0109] [0.0134] [0.0189]
Some college 1.317** 1.312** 1.334**
[0.0137] [0.0174] [0.0231]
Bachelor’s 1.449** 1.414** 1.486**
[0.0177] [0.0229] [0.0286]
Grad 1.470** 1.461** 1.474**
[0.0235] [0.0310] [0.0367]
# of children 0.969** 0.980** 0.955**
[0.00280] [0.00361] [0.00447]
Own home 1.187** 1.206** 1.162**
[0.00900] [0.0118] [0.0140]
UI dummy 0.836** 0.913** 0.742**
[0.00715] [0.0101] [0.0102]
Family non-labor income 0.978** 0.971** 0.989**
[0.00102] [0.00131] [0.00165]
Observations 136,320 79,558 56,762
Recession FE YES YES YES
State FE YES YES YES
seEform in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 3.3: Estimated effects on probability of exit to re-employment, 1979 to 2012, by gender
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spouse employed 1.370** 1.067* 1.057 1.022 1.065*
[0.0340] [0.0281] [0.0320] [0.0312] [0.0326]
Female 3.009** 2.961** 2.999** 2.953**
[0.0600] [0.0593] [0.0602] [0.0593]
Age 0.849** 0.855** 0.849** 0.855**
[0.00488] [0.00495] [0.00492] [0.00496]
Age2 1.002** 1.002** 1.002** 1.002**
[7.02e-05] [7.06e-05] [7.08e-05] [7.09e-05]
Black 0.834** 0.824** 0.819** 0.823**
[0.0285] [0.0296] [0.0295] [0.0296]
HS 0.909** 0.937** 0.929** 0.937**
[0.0214] [0.0224] [0.0223] [0.0225]
Some college 0.976 1.029 1.004 1.028
[0.0263] [0.0282] [0.0277] [0.0284]
Bachelor’s 0.765** 0.803** 0.794** 0.795**
[0.0274] [0.0291] [0.0291] [0.0291]
Grad 0.809** 0.819** 0.840** 0.810**
[0.0397] [0.0405] [0.0420] [0.0406]
# of children 1.060** 1.060** 1.062** 1.060**
[0.00825] [0.00825] [0.00832] [0.00828]
Own home 0.951* 0.974 0.969 0.970
[0.0194] [0.0202] [0.0203] [0.0203]
UI dummy 0.636** 0.630**
[0.0149] [0.0157]
Family non-labor income 0.983** 1.003
[0.00267] [0.00290]
Observations 137,266 137,266 137,266 136,320 136,320
Recession FE NO NO YES YES YES
State FE NO NO YES YES YES
seEform in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 3.4: Estimated effects on probability of exiting the labor force, 1979 to 2012
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ALL MEN WOMEN
Spouse employed 1.065* 0.973 1.029
[0.0326] [0.0402] [0.0496]
Age 0.855** 0.880** 0.872**
[0.00496] [0.00922] [0.00644]
Age2 1.002** 1.002** 1.002**
[7.09e-05] [0.000122] [9.33e-05]
Black 0.823** 1.012 0.733**
[0.0296] [0.0600] [0.0333]
HS 0.937** 0.888** 0.958
[0.0225] [0.0354] [0.0290]
Some college 1.028 1.079 0.990
[0.0284] [0.0495] [0.0344]
Bachelor’s 0.795** 0.732** 0.802**
[0.0291] [0.0480] [0.0358]
Grad 0.810** 0.840* 0.775**
[0.0406] [0.0694] [0.0489]
# of children 1.060** 1.009 1.077**
[0.0828] [0.0138] [0.0103]
Own home 0.970 0.926* 0.972
[0.0203] [0.0339] [0.0247]
UI dummy 0.630** 0.655** 0.615**
[0.0157] [0.0264] [0.0196]
Family non-labor income 1.003 1.015** 1.001
[0.00290] [0.00516] [0.00356]
Observations 136,320 79,558 56,762
Recession FE YES YES YES
State FE YES YES YES
seEform in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 3.5: Estimated effects on probability of exiting the labor force, 1979 to 2012, by gender
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